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¶1 At first glance, the American jurisprudence of copyright and 
antitrust law appear to be in tension.
 
ABSTRACT 
Commercial-skipping technology can liberate the consumer 
and make the television business more competitive. It rose to 
prominence with the advent of the digital video recorder (DVR), 
also known as the personal video recorder (PVR).  PVRs have 
helped advertisers reach their target audience more effectively 
through personalized advertisements, and it has successfully 
pressured television networks and advertisers to innovate more 
appealing ways to induce consumers to buy advertised products.  
But even if this technology fails to enhance the business of 
television, television networks can still outpace commercial-
skipping technology in an arms race.  Through competitive 
pressure, such technology promotes innovation, progress, and a 
more competitive market without posing an undue burden on the 
entertainment industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
2  Antitrust seeks to break the 
“restraints on trade” associated with market power,3
                                                     
1 J.D. & L.L.M. in International and Comparative Law, Duke University School 
of Law, 2009. The author thanks Professor Bellemare and Professor Richman 
for their comments and guidance, and his parents for their encouragement. 
2 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372 (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2003) (“Then, too, it is widely believed that intellectual 
property law and antitrust law are enemies—that intellectual property authorizes 
patent and copyright (and perhaps also trademark and trade secret) monopolies 
that offend antitrust principles.”). 
3 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 
1898) (“But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as 
expressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain 
prices, it would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restrain, that 
it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and would therefore be 
void.”).  
  while copyright law 
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rewards the creators of innovative works with a monopoly for a limited 
period of time.4  Nevertheless, they both stem from the same English 
common law origins: “Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is 
void on the ground of public policy.”5  Whether copyright promotes 
monopoly or antitrust breaks it up, the object remains the same: to secure 
“the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”6  
The benefits to the public derive from competition via decreased prices or 
increased quality.7
¶2 Accordingly, the economic perspective of antitrust law can guide 
the development of copyright law, particularly in regards to the new 
questions presented by emerging technologies.  For example, with the 
advent of VCRs, the Supreme Court conducted an economic analysis to 
apply copyright law to this new technology in Sony Corporation of America 
v. Universal City Studios.
  Even the tendency of copyright law to confer monopoly 
status spurs competition to create among authors and inventors. 
8  Like antitrust law, the interests of the consumer 
are paramount. “Reward to the owner” constitutes “a secondary 
consideration.”9  Monopoly status to the copyright owners, in this case the 
entertainment industry represented by Universal City Studios and Walt 
Disney, served only to further “the general benefits derived by the public.”10  
Although the entertainment industry lost this case, the loss created more 
business from the proliferation of VCR technology.  It opened up new 
markets and means of distribution,11 namely, the “home-viewing” market.12
¶3 The same may prove true for the relationship between the 
technology industry and the entertainment industry today.  Specifically, 
commercial-skipping technology could provide consumers with greater 
autonomy and provide the entertainment industry with increased revenue by 
 
                                                     
4 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The 
copyright law, like patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”). 
5 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (quoting Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831)). 
6 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
7 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904) (finding that 
allowing monopolies to remain intact would destroy the public benefits of 
competition). 
8 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1983) (considering impact of the technology on market for 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works). 
9 Id. at 429. 
10 Id. 
11 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
12See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance 
and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 499-500 
(2002) (“The movie industry, for example, feared and fought VHS technology, 
although the technology eventually revitalized the movie business by opening a 
secondary ‘home-viewing’ market.”). 
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making television more appealing and competitive with other forms of 
entertainment.13  Television has lost viewers because of the increasing 
popularity of the internet, but research indicates that commercial-skipping 
technology can make television a more competitive entertainment medium.  
Viewers who purchased a particular brand of DVRs watched an average of 
three hours of television more than they did before they made their 
purchase.14
¶4 Because this technology may ultimately make the television 
business more competitive, it does not fall under the ambit of Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster.  In Grokster, the Supreme Court 
held peer-to-peer music sharing networks liable for inducing copyright 
infringement to the harm of music studios.
 
15  In contrast, commercial 
skipping technology promotes what the Grokster Court sought to preserve: 
“innovation having a lawful promise.”16  This term can be defined with the 
insights of Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that the “creative destruction” 
of obsolete technologies, market strategies, and commercial values 
ultimately fuel the capitalist economy.17
¶5 Part I of this iBrief will summarize the history of television 
commercials to provide a context for how Schumpeter’s wisdom and legal 
precedent applies to commercial-skipping technology and DVRs.  Part II 
will illuminate how these technologies further consumer interest.  Part III 
reveals how these technologies ultimately advance commercial interests.  
Part IV contains an antitrust approach to market power to prescribe the ideal 
relationship among these competing interests: Copyright laws that promote 
creativity in television should not discourage the development and 
distribution of commercial-skipping technology.  Commercial-skipping 
technology does not infringe upon copyright protection as some members of 
 
                                                     
13 See Michael Lewis, Boom Box, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 13, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/13/magazine/boom-box.html (reporting 
concerns that the internet is gaining more consumers at the cost of television 
companies and suggesting that emerging technologies are attracting more 
viewers). 
14 Id. (noting that the data was gathered and reported by SonicBlue, a 
manufacturer of this technology). 
15 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 
(2005). 
16 Id. at 937. 
17 See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84, 96 
(Routledge 1994) (1942) (“Progress entails, as we have seen, destruction of 
capital values in the strata with which the new commodity or method of 
production competes.”); see also STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE 
DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 160 (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1990) (1971) (observing how legal precedent supports the 
process of creative destruction). 
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the entertainment industry claim, but rather, promotes a more competitive 
entertainment industry. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TELEVISION COMMERCIALS 
¶6 Before the advent of television, “a relatively small group of theater 
owners” possessed oligopolistic control over access to films.18 They earned 
their revenue by charging the public for each viewing. The advent of 
television opened up a new market for “live and shorter duration 
programming,” and also provided a secondary market for films released in 
theaters.19  Broadcast television could reach a wide audience at a marginal 
cost of zero.20  However, with this new technology came a new 
complication.  Initially, copyright owners and broadcasters could not charge 
their customers on a per viewing basis.  Instead, they developed an 
advertising-based model where the payments of advertisers, rather than the 
direct financial contribution of consumers became the primary source of 
funding.21  With only three stations available, playing advertisements at 
approximately the same time, consumers had little choice but to watch 
advertisements,22  each lasting sixty seconds in length.23  Advertisers could 
also pay to place their name on the title of the television program, as was 
the case with NBC’s “Colgate Theatre” and “Texaco Star Theater.”24
¶7 Not until Sony introduced the Betamax video recording device, a 
storage device later known as the VCR, could consumers fast forward 
through commercials on programs that they recorded without watching.
 
25
                                                     
18 Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the 
Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 63, 106 (2002–2003). 
19 Id.  
20 Konstantinos Chorianopoulos & Diomidis Spinellis, Coping with TiVo : 
Opportunities of the Networked Digital Video Recorder, 24 TELEMATICS AND 
INFORMATICS 48, 50 (2007). 
21 Menell, supra note 18, at 106. 
22 Id. at 107. 
23 Tina M. Lowrey et al., The Future of Television Advertising, in MARKETING 
COMMUNICATION: NEW APPROACHES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND STYLES 113, 121 
(Allan J. Kimmell ed., 2005). 
24 Joe Flint & Emily Nelson, “All My Children” Gets Revlon Twist, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 2002, at B1. 
25 See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE 
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 114-16 (Norton & Co. 1987) (reporting television 
executives’ newfound fears of consumers skipping commercials). 
  
In the alternative, they could pause their VCRs to avoid taping the 
commercials, a tactic that required watching the commercials to 
appropriately time the button pressing. Commercial-skipping technology 
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was available in these analog VCRs,26 but this technology was not 
particularly effective or convenient.27  It did not present as much of a threat 
to the entertainment industry as the DVR.28  With the capacity to fast-
forward through commercials and unwanted materials sixty times the 
regular playback speed, and more convenient features to select television 
programming to be recorded, the advent of DVR in the late 1990s posed a 
“cataclysmic” event to some executives in the entertainment industry.29  Out 
of this new technology emerged two rivals: SonicBlue, which manufactured 
ReplayTV, and TiVo.30  Only TiVo remains; pending lawsuits pressured 
SonicBlue to file for bankruptcy.31  TiVo survived because it adopted a 
friendly approach toward television networks by eliminating the form of 
commercial skipping most attractive to consumers.32  Because of TiVo’s 
conciliatory approach and SonicBlue’s bankruptcy, consumers can no 
longer use technology that can skip commercials in thirty second 
increments, or better yet, automatically detect and erase commercials.33
II. CONSUMER INTERESTS 
 
¶8 In Sony, the Supreme Court intimated the autonomy of the 
consumer.34
                                                     
26 Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 
  No longer could the network and entertainment industry hold 
200, at 51. 
27 See Rob Pegoraro, Adding Replay Value to TV, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1999, at 
N78 (describing ReplayTV’s “Quick Skip” feature as “very empowering” and 
not prone to the mistake that commercial-skip VCRs make in being “fooled by 
momentary blank screens in the middle of a show”); see Lewis, supra note 13 
(“The VCR proved too unwieldy to be used for anything but rented videos. The 
remote control enabled people to surf but not so much that they spooked Procter 
& Gamble and General Motors and the rest.”). 
28 Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 51.  
29 Frank Rose, The Fast-Forward, On-Demand, Network-Smashing Future of 
Television, WIRED, Oct. 2003, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.10/tv.html [hereinafter Rose, Fast-
Forward]; see Michael Freedman Zapper War, FORBES, Jul 8, 2002, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0708/046.html (noting how fast TiVo 
enable viewers to speed through commercials). 
30 Farhad Manjoo, TiVo Town or SonicBlue City?, WIRED, Jun. 6, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53008,00.html. 
31 Kevin Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine to Promote the 
Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies, 
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 111, 155 (2005). 
32 See Menell, supra note 18, at 171-72 (contrasting the strategies TiVo and 
SonicBlue toward the entertainment industry and noting the corresponding 
outcomes). 
33See id. at 125 (describing the features of ReplayTV that are now extinct). 
34 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 
408 (2003). 
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their audience captive to rigid television programming schedules. VCR 
technology freed consumers from these shackles.  The Court quoted with 
approval the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the corporation that 
owned and produced Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood, who spoke of the 
autonomy of the consumer: 
Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by others.  
My whole approach in broadcasting has always been, “You are an 
important person just the way you are.  You can make healthy 
decisions.”  Maybe I’m  going on too long, but I just feel that anything 
that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, 
in a healthy way, is important.35
¶9 Mr. Rogers referred to the sovereignty of individuals to make their 
products work for them and their daily activities.
 
36  For similar reasons, 
Professor Ralph Brown extolled “the consumer as an individual,”37 whose 
autonomy is threatened by “a bombardment of stupefying symbols.”38  
Judicial recognition of the sovereignty of the individual to be free from 
corporate dominance can be traced back to 1904, when the Supreme Court 
sustained the government’s argument that a failure to enforce Congressional 
antitrust legislation would put “the public at the absolute mercy of the 
holding corporation.”39  When the Court used similar language in the same 
opinion, it reaffirmed its admonishment against putting the consumer “at the 
mercy of a single holding.”40
¶10 The Supreme Court has promoted traditional competition, confined 
to a single sector of the economy or a single vertical channel 
 
41  Under this 
arrangement, a distributor of a product may be brought into traditional 
competition with the manufacturers of that product. For example, in 
Addyson Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court enforced the Antitrust 
Act of 1890 against a cartel of cast-iron pipe manufacturers conspiring to 
reduce competition.42  In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, The 
Court enforced the same Act against railroad operators forming an unlawful 
combination to inhibit competition.43
                                                     
35 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445 n.27 
(1984). 
36 See id. 
37 Ralph S. Brown. Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of 
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1180 (1948). 
38 Id. at 1182. 
39 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325 (1904). 
40 Id. at 327.  
41 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 137 (describing different types of competition). 
42 175 U.S. 211, 212 (1899). 
43 193 U.S. 317-18 (1904). 
  Laws promoting traditional 
competition like the Antitrust Act protect against both horizontal 
200x DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. x 
agreements and vertical agreements.44  They give the consumer a greater 
choice among competing brands and products, thus promoting the 
sovereignty of the consumer.  Autonomous competition also protects the 
sovereignty of the consumer and the interests of the public, but through a 
different process that materializes with the advent of new technologies.45  
Joseph Schumpeter referred to this process as “creative destruction,” which 
he argued constitutes “the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist markets from failing.”46
¶11 Copyright tends to emerge from the “interstices of the censorship,” 
according to Benjamin Kaplan’s interpretation of Sir Henry Maine’s 
aphorism.
  Schumpeter’s observation reflects a 
lesson that history has repeatedly taught: the exclusion of perceived threats 
to markets, products, and economic structures often undermines progress by 
rewarding inefficiency.  The consequences of neglecting this lesson have 
become apparent with the history of copyright law. 
47  As early as 1586, the Star Chamber decreed a system of 
licensing books before their publication and granting patents for works 
meeting the approval of censors.48  The major stationers ultimately gained 
control of “a large number of patents,”49 just as the television networks of 
today own the copyrights to television shows.  Through this decree, the 
English Crown censored books and restrained ideas.50  Currently, a more 
subtle, less alarming, but still malignant kind of censorship targets the 
practice of a particular idea.  The chill of litigation, the ghost of the 
Sonicblue bankruptcy, discourages the creation of new market structures, 
which fuels the capitalist economy and drives technological progress.51
¶12 The Supreme Court promoted this kind of competition long before 
Schumpeter did with its 1837 decision Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge.
 
52
                                                     
44See, e.g. N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 335, 337 (observing how Congress promotes free 
competition by prohibiting horizontal agreements by railroad companies to 
refrain from competition).  
45 See id. 
46 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 
1276 (2005). 
47 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT REPUBLISHED 4 
(Iris C. Geik et al. eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2005) (1967). 
48 Id. at 3-4. 
49 Id. at 4. 
50 Id. 
  This case arose because of the decision of entrepreneurs to defy 
economic conventions and usurp “one of the most profitable companies in 
51 See Kutler, supra note 177, at 160 (“The doctrine of the Charles River Bridge 
case provided, and continues to offer, the formal answer because it fashioned a 
legal doctrine to justify the process of creative destruction.”). 
52 36 U.S. 420 (1837).   
200x DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. x 
its day,” The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge.53  This corporation 
emerged after the decision of the Massachusetts legislature to replace a 
ferry service from Charlestown to Boston with a bridge.54  In 1785, it 
chartered the company The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge to 
construct this new mode of transportation, to operate it, and to charge tolls 
for forty years.55  The legislature subsequently extended this term to seventy 
years, but the demand for access to the bridge exceeded its capacity before 
this term expired.56  To meet this increased demand, the Warren Bridge 
emerged.57  It received permission to charge the same tolls as the Charles 
River Bridge for six years; after this point, the public could access the 
bridge for free.58  The Warren Bridge received a “fixed profit” from its six 
years charging tolls.59  It represented the superior business model (and 
encouraged states to grant charters that better served the public interest),60 
just as the Charles River Bridge exploited superior technology to supplant 
the more expensive ferry boats that held its customers to more inflexible 
schedules.61
Turnpike roads have been made in succession, on the same line of 
travel; the later ones interfering materially with the profits of the first.  
These corporations have, in some instances, been utterly ruined by the 
introduction of newer and better modes of transportation and traveling.  
In some cases, railroads have rendered the turnpike roads on the same 
  More inefficient technologies and businesses have 
continuously faced destruction by superior competition, a principle 
recognized by Chief Justice Taney: 
                                                     
53 Ku, supra note 46, at 1235.  
54 Id. at 1234-35. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 1235. 
57 Id. at 1234. 
58 Id.  
59 See id. at 1240 (“The Charles River Bridge investors could have insisted that 
the charter include an express grant of monopoly privileges, and the state could 
have chosen to fund the construction of the bridge by guaranteeing only the 
recovery of costs and some fixed profit similar to the charter for the Warren 
Bridge.”). 
60 See Kutler, supra note 17, at 19-23, 29-30 (describing how public 
dissatisfaction with the Charles River Bridge over issues such as narrowness, 
excessive crowds, dangerousness, and excessive tolls promoted the development 
of new business models that did not entail the “public injustice” of “heavy 
tolls”); See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 
1836-1937, at 112 (1991) (“The state originally should have granted a charter 
that permitted the private company to collect tolls until it recovered its costs plus 
profits, when the bridge would become the state’s.”). 
61 See Kutler, supra note 177, at 7-8, 12-13 (describing the problems with the 
ferry service and public enthusiasm for replacing the ferry service with a 
bridge).  
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line of travel so entirely useless, that the franchise of the turnpike 
corporation is not worth preserving.62
¶13 The Chief Justice wrote during the emergence of new forms of 
autonomous competition.  He recognized that “newer and better modes of 
transportation” should out-compete obsolete ones in the most traditional 
sense.
 
63  The competitor offering the best services at the cheaper prices 
should win.  But new technologies can also discipline existing ones with the 
threat of market adoption or market extinction.64
¶14 For example, when Sony introduced the VCR, it forced the 
entertainment industry to adapt to this new public benefit—to spend 
resources adjusting to new distribution mechanisms.
  It can force companies 
like the Charles River Bridge to adjust to new business structures and 
experiment with ideas that would not otherwise be considered.  Competitors 
in this realm of technology may in fact find one another mutually beneficial, 
but only if they learn to utilize one another. 
65  It did not directly 
compete with this new technology in the traditional sense because VCRs 
occupied a different market; VCRs and television programming were not 
substitutes for one another.  Indeed, they were complements that eventually 
expanded the markets of one another, yet the entertainment industry feared 
that VCRs would render its primary source of revenues, advertising, a 
nullity.  It also feared that as more viewers shifted to using VCRs, the 
ratings would decline because of inaccuracies in measurement, and 
consequently, revenues as well.66  Out of this fear, it sued Sony for 
copyright infringement.67  Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
Sony because of the “public interest in making television broadcasting more 
available.”68  Just as the Warren Bridge served the public interest by 
facilitating transportation across the river, the Betamax served the public 
interest by facilitating access to television.69
                                                     
62 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 551-52 (1837). 
63 Id. at 551. 
  Just as the bridge freed the 
public from the rigid time schedules of ferries, the VCR freed the public 
from rigid television programming schedules.  In each case, markets were 
disrupted for the sake of economic efficiency and the public interest. 
64 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 177, at 85 (“It disciplines before it attacks.”). 
65 See LARDNER, supra note 255, at 323-24 (“By 1985 the flow of theatrical 
movies into home video was slowing down, while the output of original 
programming, mainly in the how-to and kid vid genres, was speeding up; and 
the studios were doing their best to adjust.”). 
66 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 452 (1984). 
67 See id. at 420.  
68 Id. at 454. 
69 Ku, supra note 466, at 1247 (drawing a similar analogy between Charles 
River Bridge and peer-to-peer technology).  
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¶15 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. 
Grokster, “[t]he introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old 
markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold 
through well-established distribution mechanisms.  Yet, history has shown 
that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing 
interests . . . .”70  This case, ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court, 
arose from peer-to-peer music file sharing technology, but it was the 
expressed illegal purpose of the defendants that led the Court to rule against 
the defendants because of their intent to induce copyright infringement.71  
The effort of defendant companies to usurp the source of demand from the 
entertainment industry constituted a particularly salient feature of intent.72  
One of the defendants displayed a particularly egregious disregard for the 
law when he declared that “[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and 
get sued. It’s the best way to get in the new[s].”73  Perhaps this flagrantly 
illegal intent led Justice Breyer to distinguish Grokster from other 
technological innovations in his concurring opinion, joined by Justices 
Stevens and O’Connor.74  Justice Breyer made this distinction after 
acknowledging the litany of legal uses that Grokster technology may offer 
in the future: “Of course, Grokster itself may not want to develop these 
other noninfringing uses.  But Sony’s standard seeks to protect not the 
Groksters of this world (which in any event may well be liable under 
today’s holding), but the development of technology more generally.”75  
Therefore, Grokster does not disturb the protection Sony affords to 
emerging technology and autonomous competition.  According to Justice 
Breyer, Sony shelters technologies “that help disseminate information and 
ideas more broadly or more efficiently,” such as VCRs and digital 
recorders.76
¶16 Justice Breyer’s analysis expounds upon the tension that the 
majority of the Court recognized “between the respective values of 
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting 
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of 
liability for copyright infringement.”
  
77 Only what the Court considers 
creative pursuits, Breyer appears to suggest, “help disseminate information 
and ideas more broadly or more efficiently.”78
                                                     
70 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 
(9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
71 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941. 
72 Id. at 939. 
73 Id. at 925. 
74 Id. at 949-55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 955 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
76 Id. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 928. 
78 Id. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 However, while the majority 
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answered the question of whether Grokster’s product is “capable of 
‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses” by 
answering what infringement and culpable intent mean,79 Breyer focused 
more on the creative promise of noninfringement uses.80 In other words, the 
majority and concurrence agreed on the same basic question, but diverged 
only in which side of the legal coin it paid attention to– positive creative 
promise or illegal, culpable infringement. Both are important.81
¶17 Commercial-skipping technology also introduces autonomous 
competition.  Once again, the entertainment industry has fought this 
technology because of similar fears over loss of revenues from advertising, 
but once again, these fears may prove unfounded.  Commercial-skipping 
technology can force television networks to reevaluate their policies toward 
advertisers, but this would make advertising more efficient for the consumer 
through DVRs.
 
82
¶18 Even the greatest enemies of commercial skipping, who consider 
the technology a form of theft, namely, former head of Turner Broadcasting 
Systems Jamie Kellner, acknowledge the way the technology motivates 
them to provide more convenience to consumers: “I’m a big believer we 
have to make television more convenient or we will drive the penetration of 
PVRs and things like that, which I’m not sure is good for the cable industry 
or the broadcast industry or the networks.”
 
83  For Kellner, the threat of 
purported theft generates creativity, or at least the expenditure of corporate 
resources to better serve the consumer.84  If networks decrease the amount 
of commercials, they would also decrease the incentive of consumers to 
invest in commercial-skipping technology.  The commercial skip feature 
would also encourage consumers to substitute away from analog VCRs to 
DVRs.  This technology can “unbundle ads from the content” and instead 
personalize them to an individual’s personal characteristics.85
                                                     
79 Id. at 934. 
80 Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
81 Id. at 934. 
82 Randal Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and 
Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004). 
83 Interview of Jamie Kellner, VOD’s Ad-Skipping Irks Kellner, in Staci D. 
Kramer, Content’s King, CABLE WORLD 32 (Apr. 29, 2002); see Picker, supra 
note 82, at 206 (describing Kellner’s position and his attack on commercial-
skipping technology as “infamous[]”). 
84 Interview of Jamie Kellner, supra note 83 (calling commercial skipping theft 
when asked to explain why PVRs pose a threat that motivated him to make 
television more convenient) 
85 Picker, supra note 82, at 207. 
  Although 
commercials would decline, they would also be individually tailored to the 
viewer’s interests.  Consequently, consumers could spend less time learning 
only about products that would interest them. 
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¶19 Through unbundling, consumers would receive a greater benefit 
from the commercial itself: information.  Commercials inform the consumer 
about product qualities, prices, and other information that can enable them 
to make more rational purchasing decisions.86  Fewer, but far more relevant, 
advertisements reduce the search costs borne by the consumer in sifting 
through and processing this information.  Because commercial technology 
facilitates the dissemination of commercial information more efficiently, it 
meets Sony’s standard as interpreted by Justice Breyer in Grokster: “Sony 
thereby recognizes that the copyright laws are not intended to discourage or 
control the emergence of new technologies, including (perhaps especially) 
those that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or more 
efficiently.”87
Sony’s rule is forward looking. It does not confine its scope to a static 
snapshot of a product’s current uses (thereby threatening technologies 
that have undeveloped future markets).  Rather, as the VCR example 
makes clear, a product’s market can evolve dramatically over time.  
And Sony—by referring to a capacity for substantial noninfringing 
uses—recognizes that fact. Sony’s word “capable” refers to a 
plausible, not simply a theoretical, likelihood that such uses will come 
to pass, and that fact anchors Sony in practical reality.
  The current use of this efficiency-enhancing technology has 
less legal relevance than the potential use: 
88
¶20 Perhaps even more than the Betamax, DVRs have a great potential 
for noninfringing uses.  Hollywood itself implicitly recognized this 
potential when it invested in the only major DVR technologies: TiVo and 
SonicBlue.
 
89  Disney, NBC, Time Warner, and Viacom’s Showtime 
invested in ReplayTV before SonicBlue acquired this product.90  AOL Time 
Warner also invested “millions in advertising dollars to help promote the 
TiVo service.”91  These companies saw the potential of DVRs to bolster, 
not threaten, the benefits they received from their copyrights.  The interests 
of consumers and advertisers also converge, for viewers replay commercials 
they find interesting.92
                                                     
86 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 975, 1002 (2002) [hereinafter Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure]. 
87 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 958 
89 Molly Prior, TV Revolution gets Personal; Personal Video Recorders, DSN 
RETAILING TODAY, Sept. 4, 2000, at 37. 
90 Networks, Studios Fear PVR Could Reshape Home Entertainment, AUDIO 
WEEK, Nov. 26, 2001 [hereinafter Networks]. 
91 Monica Hogan, TiVo Curbs Spending on Brand Awareness, MULTICHANNEL 
NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at 34. 
92 Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 20, at 51. 
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¶21 Yet, the entertainment industry filed three lawsuits against 
SonicBlue, partly out of concerns over ReplayTV’s capability to skip 
commercials.93  Although the entertainment industry filed lawsuits based on 
specific features of its own erstwhile investment, Sony suggests that a 
company cannot be sued over the features of a particular product, but only 
the product itself: “The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other 
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it 
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”94  The Court 
analyzed the copying equipment—in this case, the VCR—as a single entity.  
It did not distinguish between the ability of the equipment to copy videos 
from the ability of the equipment to fast-forward through commercials, or to 
pause during recording.  It could have approved the Betamax on the 
condition that Sony eliminate the fast-forward, rewind, and pause functions, 
but it did not.95  Instead, it quoted the District Court’s opinion about how 
few consumers exploit the fast-forward feature to skip commercials, and its 
conclusion that “[a]dvertisers will have to make the same kinds of 
judgments they do now about whether persons viewing televised programs 
actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them” with approval.96  
The district court did not analyze the benefit or the cost (aside from 
tediousness to the consumer) of the fast-forward feature to the viewer, and 
neither did the Supreme Court.  Both courts effectively sidestepped this 
question.  The Supreme Court focused almost exclusively on the “primary 
use of the machine:” “time-shifting,” or the ability of the viewers to watch 
television recordings according to their own schedules.97
III. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 
 
¶22 A shorter duration of television commercials would benefit the 
entertainment industry because it would make advertising more attractive to 
advertisers who attempt to induce consumers to buy a particular product.  
The goal of advertising converges with the goal of the trademark as 
described by Justice Frankfurter: 
A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to 
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The 
owner of a market exploits this human propensity by making every 
                                                     
93 Networks, supra note 90. 
94 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
95 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 119 (recognizing this alternative). 
96 Sony, 464 U.S. at 453 n.36. 
97 Id. at 423. 
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effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing 
power of a congenial symbol.98
Like the trademark, the success of an advertisement depends on its drawing 
power.
 
99  In addition to minimizing confusion over different trade names 
and guarding against the misappropriation of creative efforts, trademark 
protection aims to prevent the dilution of commercial symbols100  Dilution 
theory suggests that the wider use of a symbol leads to a diminished value, 
and laws have been developed according to this theory.101  Most recently, 
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 aims to protect the trademark 
from “conduct that lessens the distinctiveness and value of the mark.”102
¶23 Likewise, increased clutter in television advertising can reduce the 
attention, recall, and persuasion of viewers.
 
103  These findings raise the 
concern of advertisers.104  Furthermore, diminished audience size has 
decreased the demand of advertisers to purchase more commercial 
inventory in order to reach the same size of audience.105  Television 
networks tried to compensate by charging more for the same amount of 
commercial time.  They attempted to boost the demand of advertisers by 
making the supply more valuable, but this strategy only caused advertisers 
to retreat from their business with television stations.106
                                                     
98 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S. 203, 
205 (1942), superseded by statute, Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, as 
recognized in A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 61 U.S.P.Q.2D 
1637 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“Both Century Distilling and Mishawaka were decided 
prior to the passage of the Lanham [A]ct which, departing from the Trade-Mark 
Act of 1905, made any award of monetary relief specifically subject to 
‘principles of equity.’”). 
  If, instead, the 
99 See Brown, supra note 37, at 1191-92 (explaining the application of dilution 
theory to marketing). 
100 See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Famous Mark” for 
Purposes of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c), Which 
Provides Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks, 165 A.L.R. FED. 625 (2000) 
(describing how the Federal Trademark Dilution Act creates remedies in the 
case of the dilution of famous marks).  
101 See 152 Cong. Rec. H.6963, H.6964 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ( “A 
2003 Supreme Court decision, Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., compelled 
the Committee on the Judiciary to review the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. . 
. .Enactment of this bill will eliminate confusion on key dilution issues that have 
increased litigation and resulted in uncertainty among the regional circuits.”). 
102 152 Cong. Rec. at H.6964 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
103 Robert Kent, Competitive Clutter in Network Television Advertising: Current 
Levels and Advertiser Responses, 35 J. ADVERTISING RES. 49, 51 (1995). 
104 Id. at 49. 
105 Marian Azzaro, At Networks, Less Means More, BROADCASTING & CABLE, 
Dec. 1, 2003, at 50. 
106 Id. 
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television stations reduce the supply of advertisements available, and the 
total duration of commercial breaks, then a new equilibrium could be 
reached.  Commercial-skipping technology catalyzes this process by 
exerting additional pressure on television networks to adjust to a market less 
dependent on conventional television advertising. 
¶24 Because commercial-skipping technology can persuade customers 
to switch to DVRs, it has the potential to boost the demand of advertisers 
through ad personalization.  More important than the total audience exposed 
to commercials is the audience interested in actually buying the goods.  No 
matter how enticing the advertisement, a commercial for dog food can never 
appeal to people allergic to dogs.107  A commercial for a luxury 
international travel package cannot induce viewers without the budget to 
afford it.  By unbundling ads from content, advertisers could deliver their 
message to their ideal target—not just viewers, but interested viewers.  
TiVo users interested in Sprite, for example, have used their remote control 
to choose additional exposure to Sprite advertising.108
¶25 Advertisers and technology companies could also collaborate to 
provide the consumers a greater range of options regarding their level of 
exposure to advertisements.  Murdoch’s News Corporation exploited the 
potential of such a relationship by introducing XTV.
 
109  This DVR gives 
consumers the option of paying a fee to skip advertisements on some 
shows.110  On other shows, consumers may be forced to watch only one ad 
for each commercial break with the fast forward feature disabled.111
                                                     
107 See Picker, supra note 82, at 205 (“Next time you turn on your television, 
actually watch the commercials and you will quickly see how poorly the 
economic model of TV is working. They put on a commercial for dog food, but 
you are allergic to dogs.”). 
  
Regardless, Murdoch’s News Corporation has worked with advertisers to 
offer consumers a product that balances all interests.  News Corporation 
receives revenues for its product, consumers have a wider range of possible 
purchases available, and advertisers have another outlet to serve their clients 
without fear of the fast forward button.  Although premium channels like 
HBO already offer commercial-free television, XTV could introduce a 
108 Press Release, TiVo Inc., Sprite’s ‘subLYMONal’ Advertising to Be 
Featured on TiVo (July 25, 2006), available at 
http://investor.tivo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=106292&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1254260; see Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 
51. 
109Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 20, at 53. 
110 Frank Rose, Murdoch’s Must-See TV, WIRED, Sep. 2000, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.09/mustread.html?pg=7. 
111 Id.  
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spectrum of options between television cluttered with ten minutes of ads 
every hour and television with absolutely no advertisements.112
¶26 Technology companies and manufacturers of DVRs also recognize 
that cooperation should emerge as the optimal behavior for all parties.  As 
TiVo spokeswoman Rebecca Baer suggests, the viability of networks is 
essential to the commercial success of commercial-skipping technology: 
“[a]s much as the consumers have difficulties with networks, they do 
provide the content—if you're going to completely alienate them, what will 
happen to the content?”
 
113  Accordingly, both TiVo and SonicBlue have at 
least attempted a cooperative approach with the networks whose 
advertisements they seek to zap.114
¶27 There are other alternative, more traditional forms of advertising as 
well that would not fall prey to commercial-skipping technology, such as 
product placement, which is restrained through regulation.
 
115  The top three 
American networks still manage to place an average of fifteen branded 
products on a 30 minute program, approximately 40% of which were 
“negotiated product placements.”116  Television stations even have 
integrated commercial products into the plots of their televisions shows, for 
a negotiated price.117  For instance, cosmetics company Revlon paid ABC to 
give the company a leading role in its soap opera “All My Children,” as the 
company that one of the main characters arranges for her daughter to spy 
on.118  Ford parked its Mustang in the studio audience of Leno’s The 
Tonight Show, which according to the show’s host, contained the “best seats 
in the house.” 119  It also arranged for American Idol contestants to sing “car 
songs” such as “Mustang Sally” and “Fun, Fun, Fun (‘Til Her Daddy Takes 
The T-Bird Away).”120  In 2000, Ford developed, with the help of Lions 
Gate Entertainment, its own show, “a trekking-through-the wilderness 
reality series” called No Boundaries, named after the tagline for its SUV 
campaign.121
                                                     
112 See Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 
  The WB broadcasted the show, but only for six episodes, due 
to what the marketing manager at Ford considered lack of commitment on 
200, at 56 (“Between the two 
extreme possibilities of control, there is a wide spectrum of control schemes that 
balance between the needs of the viewer and the broadcaster.”). 
113 Manjoo, supra note 300. 
114 See id. 
115 See Lowrey et al., supra note 233, at 117. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 118. 
118 Flint & Nelson, supra note 244. 
119 Rose, Fast-Forward, supra note29. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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the part of WB.122  Regardless of the reason, the threat of commercial 
skipping has prompted networks to search for creative alternatives to the 
staple thirty second television spot.  Finally, program sponsorships can give 
advertisers a bundle of benefits, including product placements and official 
recognition, often through an announcer declaring, “Brought to you 
by . . . .”123
¶28 With all these alternatives, commercial-skipping technology would 
not lead to the death of advertising and (for better or worse) the television 
business.  It would facilitate the more efficient viewing of advertisements, 
which could be viewed simultaneously with the real television show (such 
as product placements), or perhaps the title, so that consumers can 
distinguish similar programming like “Colgate Theatre” and “Texaco Star 
Theater.”  Since less than half of product placements are negotiated, 
television networks could sell more product placements rather than 
commercials.  Advertisers could still produce just as many commercials, but 
viewers would not have to watch them separately.  This additional free air 
time would reduce the adverse impacts of dilution on advertisers, and the 
advertised companies would also benefit from the free time consumers 
would gain to make additional purchases.
 
124  Content owners would also 
benefit because this additional air time could be used to attract a greater 
variety of consumers.125  A greater number of television programs would 
allow for more opportunities for creative programming ideas, an especially 
important prerogative given the reality that “all hits are flukes.”126  Each 
year, the four broadcast networks evaluate “thousands of concepts for new 
series” and buy “approximately 600 pilot scripts.”127
                                                     
122 Id. (“We were very proud of ‘No Boundaries,’ says Rich Stoddart, a 
marketing manager at Ford. ‘But you can make the most wonderful content in 
the world, and without a commitment from a distribution outlet, you have an 
audience of one.”). 
  The sheer number of 
concepts, ideas, and scripts to evaluate precludes a “reliable basis” for 
123 Lowrey, et. al. supra note 233, at 120. 
124 See Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866, at 1007 
(“Eventually, the increasing opportunity costs of watching additional television 
will exceed the marginal influence of the additional commercials, and, at that 
point, additional time spent watching television will actually begin to reduce a 
consumer’s spending on the advertised products.”). 
125 See Picker, supra note 82, at 207 (comparing the potential of unbundled 
advertising to advertisers in specialized magazines who can target particular 
varieties of consumers). 
126 Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866 at 1018 (quoting Jeff 
Sagansky, President, CBS Entertainment as quoted in Betsy Frank, On Air: 
Primetime Programming Development 1991–92, 1 (1991)). 
127 Id. (quoting William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, “All Hits are Flukes”: 
Institutional Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time 
Program Development, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1288 (1994)). 
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selecting the very best.128  Even if networks could learn which ideas would 
receive the most demand, findings in the music industry suggest that low 
demand items, in the aggregate, can earn content owners more revenue than 
the most popular.129
¶29 But television networks may develop counter-technology to 
counteract commercial-skipping technology.  The latter does not have to 
reign superior.  In fact, it does not.  Networks have already outsmarted TiVo 
technology, purportedly inadvertently.
  In the interests of advertisers, the brands they promote, 
and consumers, commercial-skipping technology may save consumers from 
some advertisements. 
130  Television networks occasionally 
air a television show a few minutes before it is scheduled to begin. 131  By 
following a popular show immediately with a lower-rated show in the place 
of a commercial break, networks can charge more for this advertisement 
that they delayed in the television schedule.132  The executive vice president 
and general manager of TiVo, Brodie Keast, claimed that the networks did 
not intend to undermine the convenience of TiVo, but ABC scheduling 
chief Jeff Bader indicated otherwise: “It’s not my job to make it easy for 
people to leave our network.”133
¶30 NBC has also devised an incentive approach by captivating viewers 
during advertisement segments with “minimovies.”
  This strategy would counter commercial-
skipping technology that skips in thirty second intervals, but not technology 
that detects commercials automatically. 
134  Other networks have 
copied this strategy with success.  Turner Networks has successfully 
courted brands such as MasterCard, Chase, and Sierra Mist by featuring 
them prominently in these miniature shows that entertain viewers during 
commercial breaks.135  In order to discourage viewers from exploiting 
commercial-skipping technology, TBS made a point of featuring amusing 
advertisements by featuring sponsors such as Sonic and Nationwide auto 
insurance in its segments entitled “Everybody Loves Funny Commercials,” 
during the first commercial break of its show “Everybody Loves 
Raymond.”136
                                                     
128 Id. 
  IAG Research indicates that the features of “Everybody 
129 Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 53 (“This finding has been 
defined as the ‘Longtail’ of sales.”). 
130 Gary Levin, Shows Start and End Just Off the Half-Hour USA TODAY, Nov. 
28, 2004, at 3D, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2004-11-28-tv-schedule_x.htm. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Rose, Fast-Forward, supra note 29. 
135 Anne Becker, Turner Knows Branding, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 23, 
2007, at 10. 
136 Id. 
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Loves Funny Commercials” enjoy “58% stronger brand recall, 100% 
stronger message recall and 60% stronger likeability scores than spots that 
ran in the show's traditional commercial pods.”137  Advertiser’s clients, such 
as Sierra Mist, have praised TBS for this initiative, and as IAG Research 
findings suggests, consumers have enjoyed the advertisements as well.138
¶31 But even for viewers that never will enjoy advertisements, 
automatic commercial detection technology is not impregnable either, 
especially given the wide variety of commercial formats.
 
139  One form of 
automatic commercial detection technology searches for black frames 
paired with silence, which can indicate the beginning of a commercial 
break, but some television stations in France and the Netherlands have 
already replaced black frames with different color frames, thereby evading 
this commercial detection technology.140  Some commercial technology 
looks for black frames spaced fifteen, thirty, or sixty seconds apart,141 but 
television stations can outsmart this technology by apportioning odd lots of 
advertisement time, such as forty-three second or twenty-seven second 
spots.  Inventors are developing more sophisticated methods of detecting 
commercial separators,142 but these methods can also be counteracted.  The 
current commercial technology still requires the same kind of guesswork by 
commercial-averse viwers as the VCR required.  The primary difference is 
that commercial-skipping technology is more automatic.  As the Sony Court 
recognized, the tendency of consumers to avoid advertisements before the 
advent of the VCR (for example, by going to another room) remains 
constant: “Advertisers will have to make the same kinds of judgments they 
do now about whether persons viewing televised programs actually watch 
the advertisements which interrupt them.”143
                                                     
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Jen-Hao Yeh, Jun-Cheng Chen, Jin-Hau Kuo & Ja-Ling Wu, TV 
Commercial Detection in News Program Videos, 3 IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON 
CIRCUITS & SYS. 4594, 4594 (2005) (“Detection of the commercials in TV 
videos is hard because the diversity of them puts up a rather high barrier to find 
an appropriate model.”). 
140 Commercial Detection in Audio-Visual Content Based on Scene Change 
Distances on Separation Boundaries, U.S. Patent No. 20,030,123,841 (filed Dec. 
27, 2001). 
141 Commercial Skip and Chapter Delineation Feature on Recordable Media, 
U.S. Patent 7,272,295 (filed Nov. 1, 2000). 
142 Id. 
143 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 453 n.36 
(1984) (citing Universal Studios Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am. 480 F. Supp. 429, 
468 (1979)). 
  Advertisers would still accrue 
the same kind of benefits they did with the introduction of VCRs: Even if 
consumers watching commercials zip past them with the fast-forward 
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feature, there would still be “a positive effect on the recall and the 
recognition of Ads, when compared to viewing the same advertising 
message just once,” so long as these zipped commercials are watched 
repeatedly.144
¶32 The perceived threat of commercial-skipping technology may also 
open new markets, and consequently, new fields of employment. 
Companies like Overpeer have grown to assist record labels in countering 
file sharing sites by overwhelming them with “spoof files,”
 
145 and 
broadcasters can follow suit.  These industries would still come with costs, 
but these costs would be borne by the entertainment industry, not by either 
the individual users pressured by the entertainment industry to settle 
copyright infringement actions,146 or future entrepreneurial enterprises 
chilled from testing the legal limits of consumer freedom.147  Past 
entrepreneurial failures, such as the bankruptcy of SonicBlue, illustrate the 
danger of the threat of litigation to nascent innovation.148  Natural market 
forces, not extra litigation, would best resolve potential issues because the 
market can best account for society’s interest “in promoting the 
development of new technologies and . . . experimenting with new business 
opportunities and market structures.”149
¶33 Advertisers and broadcasters have felt the pressure from consumers 
and the technology industry to rethink their methods of commercial 
promotion, as evidenced by ABC’s effort to integrate Revlon into its soap 
opera’s storyline.  The costs of conventional advertising outlets encourage 
 
                                                     
144 Chorianopoulos & Spinellis, supra note 200, at 51. 
145 David Segal, A New Tactic in the Download War; Online ‘Spoofing’ Turns 
the Tables on Music Pirates, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at A01. 
146See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma 
of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 725, 
749-50 (2005) (explaining the costs of litigation and the potential of litigation as 
a profit source for the industry). 
147 See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. 
L. J. 1, 33 (2006) (“Although users have repeatedly shown that they will reward 
entrepreneurs who provide them with freedom and flexibility to use. . . digital 
content, the costs of providing freedom have risen sharply in the wake of the 
content industries' highly-publicized legal victories against MP3.com, Napster, 
Grokster, SonicBlue, and other innovators.”).  
148 See id. (“The costs of raising startup capital have risen commensurately, and 
may become prohibitive if the suit against Napster's backers succeeds.”). 
149 See William Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright 
Infringement: Napster and Beyond, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 113, 118 
(2003) (“Copyright law is important, but at some point copyright incentives 
must take a backseat to other societal interests, including an interest in 
promoting the development of new technologies and an interest in 
experimenting with new business opportunities and market structures.”). 
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this creativity.  If they choose to spend their resources countering 
commercial-skipping technology instead, the burden will shift to viewers 
who have a substantial interest in avoiding exposure to commercials.  At 
this point, the consumer would have to spend additional resources to acquire 
the latest generation of commercial-skipping technology to counter the 
efforts of the entertainment industry.  If the interest of the entertainment 
industry in preventing commercial skipping exceeds the interest of the 
consumer in using this technology, the entertainment industry need only 
invest in countering the current generation of commercial-skipping 
technology to defeat it.  Under the efficiency principle, whichever side has a 
greater interest in (or against) this technology will prevail by investing more 
resources in it. 
¶34 If the entertainment industry makes this initial investment to 
counter the first generation of commercial-skipping technology, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) would present another obstacle to the 
technology industry and the consumer.  It prohibits any person from 
manufacturing, importing, or providing “any technology, product, service, 
device, component, or part thereof” that “is primarily designed or produced 
for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively 
controls access” to copyrighted works.150  However, a “substantial 
consensus” has emerged that this provision is unconstitutional.151 It violates 
the First Amendment because it impairs the availability of information.152  
It permits copyright owners to exact a price that some individuals may not 
be able to afford, possibly even for information that is not protected by 
copyright.153  If anti-circumvention technology controls access to both 
copyrighted works and public domain works protected by the First 
Amendment, the DMCA precludes any effort to counter this technology, 
regardless of the purpose of this counter-technology.154
¶35  Congress may have also overstepped its constitutional authority to 
legislate under the Patent and Copyright Clause.
 
155
                                                     
150 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2009). 
151 Pamela Samuelson, The Public Domain: Mapping the Digital Public 
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 147, 161-62 
(2003). 
152 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (2001). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 25 n.99. 
155 Glenn Lunney, The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 847 
(2001) [hereinafter Lunney, Death of Copyright]. 
  This clause gives 
Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
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their respective Writings and Discoveries.”156  The Courts developed the 
fair use doctrine, and Congress later codified it, to advance the 
constitutionally enshrined Progress of Science,157 but the DMCA may 
hinder the applicability of this doctrine, and consequently, run afoul of the 
Constitution.158
¶36 Although the DMCA also prohibits imports of such technology, 
enforcement problems have already emerged.  When Napster’s file sharing 
system was held illegal, new services popped up overseas to take its 
place.
  Because of television’s function as a medium of mass 
communication relating to science, art, and civic engagement, viewers 
should have the freedom and autonomy to access this information in the 
most efficient manner. 
159  Other services attempted to evade legal accountability through a 
decentralized structure.160  Commercial-skipping technology may share a 
similar fate, and such a black market would deprive the state of tax 
revenue,161 and a favorable balance of trade.162
¶37 Copyright and limited monopolies are intended to “motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward.”
  IV. The New Market 
Dynamic 
163  Yet, in television, this reward has frequently curtailed 
creativity. Too often, copyright holders have sought to sustain their 
privileged position by stifling the development of other technologies and 
innovations.164  Excessive energies have already been invested in television 
because of excessive copyright incentives.165
                                                     
156 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
157 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994). 
  The protection that copyright 
provides may mollify the entertainment industry into accepting the market 
structure without giving due consideration to other alternatives.  On the 
158 Lunney, Death of Copyright, supra note 1555, at 847-48. 
159 Landes & Lichtman, supra note 1499, at 123. 
160 See id. (“Others designed their technologies such that there was no clear 
central party to hold accountable in court.”). 
161 Cf. MICHAEL R. CAPUTO & BRIAN J. OSTROM, Potential Tax Revenue From a 
Regulated Marijuana Market: A Meaningful Revenue Source, 53 AMER. J. OF 
ECON. & SOC. 475 (1994) (discussing potential government revenue from 
legalization of marijuana). 
162 Cf. Smuggled Sugar Leaves Local Crop Sat on the Shelf  VIET. INV. REV. Apr 
29, 2002; DAVID C. JORDAN, DRUG POLITICS 59 (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1999) (noting the adverse impact of opium smuggled into China on the state’s 
balance of trade).  
163Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
164 See Ku, supra note 466, at 1242-43 (describing Charles River Bridge as an 
attempt by one interest group to exert its privileged position over the other). 
165 See Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866, at 977 n.8 
(describing the problem of excess incentives in general). 
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other hand, competition and tough markets breed creativity, as the president 
of ABC Daytime, Angela Shapiro acknowledged.  In explaining to the Wall 
Street Journal the company’s reasons for incorporating Revlon into the 
storyline of “All My Children,” she noted advertiser’s concerns about 
dilution.166  She also observed that because of competition to attract 
audiences, “none of us can look at what we do as business as usual.”167
¶38 Commercial-skipping technology could make a similar impact. It 
could act as a competitor, forcing the entertainment industry to strive for 
progress and not satisfy itself with the status quo.  On the other hand, 
broadcasters fear the free, advertiser-sponsored television may end.  The 
senior vice president of communications for the National Association of 
Broadcasters, Dennis Wharton, said, “Our member stations rely solely on 
advertising to support free, over-the-air broadcasting.”
  
Instead, competition forces these companies to not only create higher 
quality products, but also more innovative business strategies. 
168  He feared that “if 
advertising is not seen, there's less likelihood that advertisers will pay the 
money to purchase advertising.”169
¶39 The Supreme Court took a similar approach in a copyright 
infringement action against a group that parodied the song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman.”
  His insecurities may be well founded, 
but this is precisely what drives competition.  Competitors attempt to divert 
the demand of their products or services from one another; they respond by 
making their own products or services more attractive to increase demand.  
Product placement, product incorporation, ad personalization, and more 
entertaining commercials all qualify as ways to make commercials more 
attractive for both advertisers and television networks. 
170  It considered whether the defendant’s parody “would result in 
a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”171  
Because parody’s legitimate criticisms may undermine the demand for a 
product, the courts find copyright infringement only when the defendant 
usurps demand, rather than merely suppresses it.172
                                                     
166 Flint & Nelson, supra note 24. 
167 Id. 
168 Benny Evangelista, TV Moguls Are Threatened by DVRs That Zip Past the 
Ads, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2002, at E1. 
169 Id. 
170 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
171 Id. (quoting 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05 (1993)). 
172 Id. at 592. 
  Likewise, the question 
with commercial-skipping technology arises over whether such technology 
usurps the market for free television, or merely pressures it to progress. 
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¶40 Only dominant technologies, technologies that command a high 
demand, can usurp.173  Technologies with little following would be too 
insubstantial to present a threat.  In antitrust law, the dominance of 
corporations is a function of market power.  The Supreme Court has 
inferred monopoly power from “the predominant share of the market.”174
¶41 Numerous reports indicate that it does not. About ninety percent of 
households equipped with a television also have at least one VCR.
  A 
similar inference may be applied to the question of whether commercial-
skipping technology could usurp the market for free television.  To usurp 
the market for free television, commercial-skipping technology must 
dominate the alternative form of copying and replaying television: the VCR. 
175  By 
contrast, only twenty-two percent of U.S. households possess some form of 
DVR technology, and an additional 13% of households indicated an interest 
in owning DVRs.176  The threat of the DVR and prevalence of commercial-
skipping technology has waned in the entertainment industry itself.177  
According to Magna Global USA, a “big media-buying shop,” the rate of 
DVR penetration has declined, so that at its peak, DVRs will reach only 
one-third of American homes with television.178  If TiVo reached a 
penetration rate of thirty to forty percent, only one out of ten commercials 
would be lost, far from inducing the demise of free television.179  Even 
among consumers that do possess technology capable of skipping 
commercials, not all of them use it.  TiVo users only use the playback 
feature for forty percent of their prime time viewing, and of that, seventy 
percent of commercials are avoided by viewers.180
                                                     
173 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“What it may not do is usurp demand by its 
substitutive effect.”). 
174 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
175 In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the 
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming: Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C. 
C. R. 2503, 2509 (2006). 
176 Paul Jackson, Consumers and the DVR: Continued Device Adoption Hides 
the Coming Device “Virtualization”, FORRESTER RESEARCH: FOR EBUSINESS, 
CHANNEL & PRODUCT MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS, Apr 3, 2008, at 1. 
177 See Steve McClellan, TiVo’s Ad-Friendly Claim Doesn’t Sway Top 
Researchers, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jul. 7, 2003, at 12 (reporting that the 
executive vice president of research and planning at CBS considers TiVo as a 
standalone unit a failure); see Joe Mandese, DVR Threat Gets Downgraded, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 12, 2005, at 20 (reporting studies indicating that 
the DVR threat “may not be as bad as everyone thinks.”). 
178 Joe Mandese, DVR Threat Gets Downgraded, BROADCASTING & CABLE, 
Sept. 12, 2005, at 20. 
179  Steve McClellan, TiVo’s Ad-Friendly Claim Doesn’t Sway Top Researchers, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jul. 7, 2003, at 12. 
180 Id. Contra Jackson, supra note 176 (reporting only 12% of U.S DVR 
householders rarely or never use the technology to skip ads). 
  Television station 
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managers like executive vice president of Lifetime, Tim Brooks, would 
attribute statistics like these to human nature: “We are couch potatoes.”181
¶42 Aside from comparing the use of TiVo features to the prevalence of 
VCR, the competitiveness of markets can also be gauged by “how far 
buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.”
 
182  The willingness 
of buyers to choose one product or another can be measured with cross-
elasticity, or more broadly, how high a product’s price must be for 
customers to purchase substitutes.  The low demand for TiVo indicates that 
the payment structure for the DVR machine and the accompanying monthly 
subscription have dissuaded potential viewers from adopting commercial-
skipping technology, according to Roy Rothstein, senior vice president of 
programming at Zenith Media.183  The failure of TiVo as a standalone unit 
makes TiVo more amenable to working with cable and satellite services, so 
that TiVo can package its product with these services.184  Consequently, 
TiVo and other companies that offer commercial-skipping technology could 
face pressure by these services to make their products friendlier toward 
advertisers and the entertainment industry.185 Likewise, cable and satellite 
services have much to gain from other features of DVRs, such as 
personalized ads.  This situation typifies the classic free rider problem.  In 
other words, individuals would not give up their commercial skipping 
preferences in hopes that others would give up theirs to preserve free 
television for all.186  But this problem is avoidable. TiVo could advance the 
interests of the consumer in making deals with cable and satellite services.  
In fact, they already have.187  The company envisions itself as a “bridge” 
that promotes progress from both sides: consumers and networks.188
                                                     
181 See id. (“For one thing, they say, early-adapter zapping patterns very likely 
won't hold; most people just don't care enough to take action to zap the spots. 
‘We are couch potatoes,’ Brooks says.”). 
182 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 
(1956) (“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on 
how different from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, 
how far buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.”). 
  This 
arrangement centralizes consumers (or perhaps more accurately, pushes 
them aside in favor of TiVo), so that the free rider problem becomes 
183 McClellan, supra note 1777. 
184 Id.  
185 Cf. Picker, supra note 82, at 218 (“[T]he DVR will likely be distributed 
mostly through cable set top boxes…the cable operators will take account of, in 
a way that a free-standing DVR maker would not, the potential lost cable 
revenues from allowing end-users to redistribute shows.”). 
186 See id. at 219 (describing this situation as a prisoner’s dilemma). 
187 See Hogan, supra note 91 (suggesting that DirectTV bundled its product with 
TiVo as part of TiVo’s plan to package its products). 
188 Manjoo, supra note 30. 
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irrelevant.189  Through repeated dealings,190 and a well-established, bilateral 
relationship,191
¶43 But this solution does not necessarily translate well into equity, 
based on the potential objection that TiVo in this arrangement would be the 
“free rider.”  Viewers just as adverse to commercials as those with DVR 
technology must bear the boredom, while the more technologically savvy 
do not have to.  However, this differential is more closely tied with 
transaction costs and the costs of the DVR itself than equity.  Even among 
the viewers who have purchased DVR technology, they only occasionally 
use it to skip commercials.  At other times, voluntarily subjecting 
themselves to commercials qualifies as the more efficient alternative. 
 the equilibrium would shift in favor of cooperation. 
Consequently, these services would receive mutual gain with TiVo through 
cooperative product bundling. 
¶44 The implications of this technology are more complex than the 
prisoner’s dilemma, articulated in its classic formulation by Albert W. 
Tucker: 
Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have 
insufficient evidence for a conviction, and having separated both 
prisoners, visit each of them to offer them the same deal: if one 
testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains 
silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 
10-year sentence. If both stay silent, the police can sentence both 
prisoners to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays 
the other, each will receive a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must 
make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. 
However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other 
prisoner will make.192
¶45 The situation of potential TiVo consumers are analogous in that 
they must decide whether to cooperate in refraining from commercial 
skipping in order to preserve the current business model of television, or 
risk jeopardizing the future viability of television programming by seizing 
commercial skipping technology. On the other hand, the decisions 
television viewers face are more numerous than the choice of whether to 
 
                                                     
189 See Picker, supra note 82, at 219 (suggesting a more collective or more 
centralized mechanism). 
190 Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist, 
Part I: The Role of Public and Private Order Institutions, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 533, 
546-47 (1994). 
191 Cf. id. at 546 (noting that personalized human relationships foster 
cooperation in most societies). 
192 Quoted in Siang Yew Chong et al., Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Evolutionary Game Theory, in THE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA 23, 23 
(Graham Kendall et al. eds., 2007). 
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cooperate or defect posed in the classic prisoner’s dilemma. The possible 
outcomes exceed the two-by-two payoff matrix in the prisoner’s dilemma: 
mutual cooperation, mutual defection, unilateral defection by one prisoner, 
or unilateral defection by the other. The first decision confronting TiVo 
viewers is whether the technology is worth learning about, and if so, how 
much to invest in related search costs.193  In 2002, seven out of every ten 
consumers “didn’t even know what a DVR was.”194  If consumers invest 
little after learning about the technology, they may not learn about the more 
controversial features.195  After buyers of DVRs make their purchases, they 
may not want to learn how to use commercial skipping features or spend the 
energy required to operate the remote.  After all, an empowered couch 
potato is still a couch potato.196  Because of this dizzying array of choices, a 
viewer using threatening technology can still contribute to the profits of 
television networks.  Especially with these viewers’ support, copyright 
owners would have a sufficient incentive to create and distribute content 
without the full protection of copyright.  Copyright owners already have 
more incentive than necessary to prompt them to produce their works.197
¶46 This excess detracts from other parts of the economy by luring 
more people than necessary to become authors.
 
198  Indeed, the television 
industry already has more authors than it can evaluate, but copyright 
protections tend to drift from the original holders or authors to the 
distributors.199  Because authors and creators of television shows lack the 
access to get their ideas across,200
                                                     
193 Rose, Fast-Forward, supra note 29 (citing Forrester Research). 
194 Id. 
 they lack the bargaining power to retain 
their copyrights.  Commercial skipping technology may empower these 
original copyright holders to air their shows in what would otherwise be 
commercial space.  If “every hit is a fluke,” then hits are in great supply, but 
advertisement time blocks them from entering the market.  Consequently, 
the consumer would have direct access to a greater variety of creative 
works.  The relationship between creator and consumer would be more 
direct. 
195 See Menell, supra note 188, at 172 (“After initially bashing television 
executives through its early product advertisements, TiVo has discontinued 
advertisements directly attacking the major networks and has downplayed its 
product’s ability to skip commercial advertisements.”). 
196 Compare Rose, Fast-Forward, supra note 29 (“Technology is empowering 
the couch potato.”), with McClellan, supra note 1777 (“We are couch potatoes,’ 
Brooks says.”). 
197 Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure, supra note 866, at 1016-17. 
198 Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 487-89 (1996). 
199 Ku, supra note 466, at 1250. 
200 See supra ¶ 28 and notes 125-27. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶47 To effect further progress, to pressure networks to adapt more 
innovative strategies in making commercials appealing to the consumer, the 
form of commercial-skipping technology that appeals to consumers should 
be free from the threats of litigation that SonicBlue faced.201
¶48 A greater distribution of commercial skipping technologies would 
rebalance bargaining power among advertisers, their clients, television 
networks, creators of television programs, the technology industry, and the 
consumers they serve.  Currently, the networks wield too much power, 
derived from excessive copyright protection designated more for creators 
than distributors.  They have used their dominant market power to insulate 
themselves from the interests of other groups: advertisers and their clients 
concerned about dilution, creators of television shows who go unnoticed, 
and viewers who could be spending their time contributing  more efficiently 
to the economy. 
  Automatic 
commercial skipping technology pressures television networks to select a 
strategy more conducive to the interests of consumers: either make 
advertisements more palatable to consumers, or cooperate more with the 
competitors of companies that would market automatic commercial-
skipping technology, such as TiVo or News Corporation.  The fact that only 
half of product placements on television shows are actually negotiated 
suggests that while TiVo has already prompted some progress, television 
networks still have not met their potential of making television more 
appealing to consumers, and still profitable for businesses. 
¶49 On the other hand, television stations still must survive so that they 
can continue to distribute their content free of charge.  If they perceive 
commercial-skipping technology as the knell of bankruptcy and market 
failure, they have a variety of fiscally reasonable alternatives available: 
invest in counter-technology, work with advertisers to devise alternatives, 
or work with the providers of commercial-skipping technology 
themselves—or their competition.  The outcome determines whether 
commercial skipping technology threatens the entertainment industry more 
than it benefits consumers.  Accordingly, it guides these groups toward 
efficiency.  It sets the television market for a new round of autonomous 
competition. 
                                                     
201 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 156 (“The broadcasters' de facto victory in 
ReplayTV prevented the court from setting the standard for evaluating 
innovative mediums that enhance consumer autonomy in the digital television 
industry. It is necessary to develop that standard now, for digital television will 
become the next copyright litigation battleground.”). 
